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The consolidated fraud and theft guideline, U.S.S.G.
S2B1.I, has been a subject of sustained comment and
critique since its adoption in 2001. Some of the critiques
are technical and relate to issues such as the importance of
"loss" in economic crime sentencing and the proper defi-
nition of concepts like "intended loss" and "sophisticated
means." However, for the last decade or so, the dominant
complaint has been that 2 Bi.i prescribes sentences that,
particularly for many defendants in cases involving high
loss amounts, are far too long.'
Therefore, when the Commission several years ago
undertook a reexamination of economic crime sentencing,2
one of the fundamental questions it faced was whether the
charge of excessive severity was accurate, and if so, as to all
economic criminals or only some. In her January 9, 2°I5,
remarks accompanying the release of draft amendments to
S 2BI.I, Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair of the Commission,
observed that the Commission's study
has led us to believe that the fraud guideline may not
be fundamentally broken for most forms of fraud.
[Economic crime] sentences on average hew fairly
closely to the guidelines for all but the highest dollar
values, over $i million in loss. In our discussions with
judges and a comprehensive survey several years
ago, we learned that, while some judges are con-
cerned about the fraud guideline, most are relatively
satisfied with it for most types of fraud.3
In short, she seemed to say that, although the fraud
guideline works fine for "most" cases, it does not work so
well for cases with losses over $i million.4 This carefully
modulated conclusion did not go down well among those
who, like the ABA and some defense advocacy groups, feel
that the guideline is fundamentally flawed, produces
unduly high sentences for defendants across the loss
spectrum, and needs to be completely rewritten. 5 Even so,
given that eight of the sixteen steps on the loss table con-
cern loss over $i million, that there are more than 1400
cases annually with loss over $i million, and that such cases
constitute some 17 percent of the total number of fraud
defendants sentenced each year, 6 the conclusion that
§ 2Bi.I does not work well for such cases is still a moder-
ately big deal.
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Accordingly, one would have expected the latest
amendments to S 2BI.I to concentrate on the class of high-
loss offenders the Commission seemed to agree are over-
punished by the guidelines. However, the amendments
approved in April 20i 7 -though in several cases laudable
for other reasons-will have little or no material impact on
the guidelines ranges for very high-loss offenders, while
producing modest guidelines reductions for some number
of low-to-moderate-loss offenders.
In short, the Commission's ballyhooed multiyear study
of the economic crime guideline seems to have fizzled.
That is unfortunate. While I agree with the Commis-
sion's basic conclusion that for many, perhaps most, eco-
nomic offenders the guidelines do not suggest manifestly
unreasonable sentences,8 I also think that for high-loss
defendants the fraud guideline is, in Judge Saris's phrase,
"fundamentally broken." The Commission seems to
believe that the latest amendments will at least ameliorate
the high-loss offender problem. Unfortunately, the guide-
lines for high-loss offenders are so "fundamentally broken"
that these tiny tweaks will have no meaningful effect.
Accordingly, the remarks that follow: (a) describe in
some detail the historical roots and current causes of the
high-end distortion of the fraud guidelines, (b) demonstrate
that the 2015 amendments fail to solve or even materially
ease the problem, and (c) make some concrete suggestions
for bringing the guidelines for high-loss offenders into the
sphere of practical utility.
In particular, I recommend that the Commission:
Determine the maximum punishment that ought to
be imposed for economic crime in any but the most
extraordinary case, and modify S 2Bi.I so it generates
sentences scaled downward from that maximum.
* Eliminate the top four levels of the loss table.
* Reduce the number, size, and cumulative impact of
specific offense characteristics in S 2B.I by taking
steps such as
" placing a cap on the cumulative effect of the
many specific offense characteristics in S 2BI.I,
" reducing the number of offense levels
assigned to some or all specific offense char-
acteristics in S 2B.i, and
o eliminating the sophisticated means
enhancement altogether.
I. The Fraud Guideline, High-Loss Defendants, and
Factor Creep
The unrealistically high sentences now prescribed by the
guidelines for high-loss defendants are the result of four
aspects of the evolution of 2B1.I.
First, the original fraud and theft guidelines were
designed to change the pre-guideline status quo, in which
virtually all white collar criminals customarily received
probation, to a new state of affairs in which significant
white collar criminals were sentenced to prison. The orig-
inal fraud guideline, U.S.S.G. 5 2FI.I (1987), accomplished
this end by employing loss amount as the primary proxy for
offense seriousness and calibrating a "loss table" so that
defendants who caused modest-to-high losses (a minimum
of $20,000 or higher if convicted at trial, or $Ioo,ooo or
higher if convicted by plea) would have to spend at least
some time in prison. Although the first fraud guideline did
mandate prison for many defendants who would not pre-
viously have done time, it did not require very much time,
even for the worst offenders. The base offense level (BOL)
for a fraud conviction was then 6, and the highest loss
accounted for by the original table was $5 million. Offen-
ders who stole that much or more were subject to an
offense level increase of only ii, producing a total offense
level of 17 and a resultant sentencing range for a first-time
offender of 24-30 months. Moreover, the original fraud
guideline contained only one non-loss sentencing factor, an
enhancement of 2 levels for more than minimal planning or
multiple victims or a false claim to have acted on behalf of
a charity or violation of a judicial order. Thus, the maximum
possible offense level for a first-time offender under the
original S 2FI.I was 19, which translated to a sentencing
range of 30-37 months.9
Second, after 1987, in response to a variety of stimuli,
including the obvious disparity between the low sentences
prescribed by the initial guidelines for economic offenders
and the much higher sentences prescribed for drug and
other offenses, guideline sentences for economic offenses
increased steadily through the 199os. These increases were
effected in part by modifying the loss table, which in 1989
was expanded to 18 levels and a maximum loss amount of
$8o million.'0 This change alone increased sentences for
high-loss defendants because the fact of conviction (BOL 6)
plus loss amount could now generate a total offense level of
24 and a sentence range of 51-63 months without resort to
any other specific offense characteristics (SOCs). But as
time passed, the more important development was a steady
accretion of new SOCs that added offense levels on top of
the sum of the base offense level and the levels added for
loss amount. In 1988, the fraud guideline contained only
one aggravating SOC other than loss amount. By 2000,
there were sixteen aggravating SOCs other than loss
amount, which could plausibly add from 2 to 14 offense
levels in any given case." Moreover, many of these
enhancements correlated strongly with the occurrence of
high-dollar fraud.'2
Key to understanding the current dysfunction of the
fraud guideline for high-loss offenders is recognition that,
because of the logarithmic character of the 43-level Sentencing
Table, each increase in offense level has an ever-greater absolute
effect on sentence length, the higher one goes up the Table.
Adding one offense level to the total of a first-time offender
who previously had an offense level of 19 (the original 1987
maximum under 2F1.I) increases his minimum sentence
by 3 months and his maximum by 4 months. The same one-
level increase from an offense level of 30 increases the
defendant's minimum sentence by ii months and his
maximum by 14. And a one-level increase for an offender
with an offense level of 36 increases his minimum by
22 months and his maximum by 27. Consequently, as the
years passed and the guidelines added more and more
SOCs, and thus more and more offense levels to the scores
of defendants who by virtue of large loss amounts were
already bound for prison, the guideline sentences for such
defendants increased disproportionately to those who
committed lower-loss crimes.
Third, one must understand how the "Economic Crime
Package of 2001" was developed and enacted. The years-
long process that produced the package was driven by two
different concerns, and therefore proceeded until the very
end on two parallel, largely nonintersecting, tracks. On one
track was a group that believed the formerly separate theft
and fraud guidelines were duplicative and in many places
logically flawed or badly drafted. This group set out to
consolidate and rewrite the two guidelines so that they
would be easier to apply and would better differentiate
between different types and grades of economic offender.
On the other track was a group concerned with sentence
severity. This second group was divided between one fac-
tion that thought the guidelines over-emphasized impris-
onment for low-level offenders and a second contingent
(including the Justice Department and many judges and
probation officers) that felt the economic crime guidelines
did not sufficiently punish serious economic criminals.
A considerable number of important contributors to the
severity debate held both views.
Those concerned with the technical deficiencies in the
former theft and fraud guidelines focused on the many
theoretical, definitional, and structural issues presented by
the consolidation and redrafting project. The new consoli-
dated S 2BI.I went through a near-infinity of drafts that
were circulated, commented upon by all the interested
parties, redrafted, and even, in the case of the new "loss"
definition, field-tested by judges and probation officers at
a special meeting convened by the Sentencing Commission
for that purpose.'
3
Those worried about severity made some contributions
to the technical side of the project, but focused most of their
efforts on reconfiguring the loss table. They produced a new
loss table that both increased sentences for high-loss
offenders and reduced sentences for low-loss offenders.'
4
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The high-end effects were the most dramatic. The old 2000
loss table contained 18 levels and topped out at $8o million.
By contrast, the new 2001 loss table provided 26 levels of
enhancement for loss and topped out at $ioo million.
In its 2oi5 amendments, the Commission has laudably
adjusted the loss table and other related dollar-based
guideline measures to account for inflation.' 5 In that con-
nection, it is interesting to note that the $ioo million top of
the 2001 loss table was worth only about $70 million in
i989. I6 Thus, at the high end of the loss table, the new 2001
guidelines assigned an additional 8 offense levels' worth of
punishment to an amount of loss worth less in constant
dollars than the top of the 1989 loss table. Putting it another
way, the sentencing effect of an $8o million loss in 1989 dollars
was more than doubled by the 2001 guidelines.'7
Although the result of the two-track reexamination of
the economic crime guidelines was a single 2B1.1, the
truth (as I can attest from personal involvement in the
whole long affair) is that surprisingly little explicit attention
was paid to how the results of the technical rewrite would
coalesce with the results of the loss table restructuring. It
was not that the 2001 consolidated guideline added lots of
new specific offense characteristics. Indeed, the number of
SOCs remained static because the 2001 guideline elimi-
nated the former more than minimal planning enhance-
ment while adding a new two-tiered enhancement for
multiple victims. However, we failed to consider carefully
the combined effect of the very large increases at the mid-to-
high end of the new loss table and all the specific offense
characteristics that survived the transition from the old
separate guidelines to the new consolidated one.
For example, under old 5 2FI (2000), a first-time
offender fraud defendant who caused a loss of $io.I million
would have a Base Offense Level of 6, plus a i5-level
increase for loss amount, meaning that his offense level
before the addition of any specific offense characteristics
would be 21, or 37-46 months. Under new S 2B1.I (2001),
the same defendant would receive a 2o-level increase for
loss, meaning that his offense level before SOCs would be
26, or 63-78 months. In short, leaving SOCs aside, the
changed loss table produced a minimum sentence increase
for this defendant of 26 months or a little more than
2 years. Even standing alone, such an increase-2 years of
a person's life-is hardly insubstantial.
But stacking the same old pre-200i SOCs, plus the
additional role enhancements available from Chapter 3, on top
of the numbers generated by the newly enhanced loss table
magnified the sentencing impact of those old enhance-
ments dramatically. Assume our hypothetical $io-million-
loss defendant were eligible for eight additional offense
levels based on SOCs and role adjustments: 2 levels for
sophisticated means, 2 levels for more than $i million gross
receipts, 2 levels for abuse of trust (6 3Bi. 3), and 2 levels for
aggravating role (6 3BI.I). Under old S 2F1.I (2000), this
would generate an increase in offense level from 21 to 29,
and in a hike in sentencing range from 37-46 months to
87-io8 months, or about another 4 years imprisonment. But
under new S 2BI.i (2001), the same enhancements would
raise the same defendant's offense level from 26 to 34, and
his sentencing range from 63-78 months to 151-188
months, an additional 7 years. In other words, the recali-
brated 2001 loss table imposed both a direct (and con-
sciously intended) sentence increase on high-loss
defendants and an even larger indirect sentence increase
due to interaction of non-loss SOCs with the logarithmic
progression of the Sentencing Table. The combination of
the direct and indirect increases effectively doubled the
guideline sentences of some high-loss defendants, a result
few of the participants in the drafting process consciously
foresaw.'
8
Fourth, by unhappy coincidence, the effective date of the
Economic Crime Package was November i, 2001, only
about a month before the bankruptcy of the Enron Corpo-
ration and the ensuing flood of corporate accounting fraud
scandals that rocked the economy and produced the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The coincidence was an
unhappy one because the political furor of that year gen-
erated pressure for even further increases in economic
crime sentencing levels-which had just been raised to
historic levels only months before, and which no one, out-
side of Congress, felt to be unduly lenient.' 9 I have told the
story of Sarbanes-Oxley and the guidelines elsewhere.2 But
for present purposes the important point is that the Com-
mission felt obliged to raise economic crime sentences
even higher, particularly for big financial frauds, so it
enacted five changes of importance here: (i) The Base
Offense Level for fraud crimes was raised from 6 to 7. (a)
The Commission amended the loss table again, adding
a 28-level increase for more than $200 million and
a 3o-level increase for more than $400 million.2 (3) The
Commission added an additional 2-level enhancement for
250 victims, 2 on top of the existing 2- and 4-level
enhancements for io and 5o victims. 3 (4) The Commis-
sion added a 4-level enhancement for offenses involving
securities or commodities law violations by corporate offi-
cers or securities dealers and advisers. 4 (5) The Commis-
sion expanded the 4-level enhancement for substantially
jeopardizing a financial institution to include defendants
who endangered the solvency of large companies or ioo or
more individuals.2
5
Note that, with the exception of the increased Base
Offense Level, every 2003 amendment to S 2BI.I is either
directly triggered by a high loss amount (the Loss Table
amendments) or is highly correlated to a high loss amount
(250 victims, securities or commodities law offenses by
insiders, and endangerment of solvency of large companies
or many people).26 The cumulative effect of the evolution of
the economic crime guidelines from 1987 to 2000, the
2001 Economic Crime Package, and the 2003 Sarbanes-
Oxley-driven amendments has been: (i) to give loss amount
ever-increasing weight, while (2) progressively teasing out
a long list of factors that are highly correlated with big-dollar
frauds 27-and for which, therefore, the large enhance-
ments in the Loss Table are already a proxy-and giving
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those factors independent, cumulative, logarithmic weight
in setting a sentence.
To show the progressive increase in guideline sentences
for fraud defendants over the past quarter-century, I attach
Tables A-i and A-2 showing the sentences the guidelines
prescribed for an illustrative set of defendants in 1987,
I989, i99i, 199 8 , 2ooi, and 2003. The final column shows
the effects of the proposed 2015 amendments on the same
set of hypothetical defendants.
II. The Sentencing Commission's Analysis of the Fraud
Sentencing Data from FY 2012
The Sentencing Commission has quite sensibly been
interested not merely in what effect ) 2Bi.I has on hypo-
thetical defendants, but on how that guideline is applied in
actual cases. Commission staff has analyzed the cases
sentenced under ) 2BI.I in FY 2ol2 and presented some
very interesting statistics, which can be accessed at the
Commission's website.
8
Several critical facts emerge from this data. First, out of
8,503 fraud defendants sentenced in 2012, only 123 were
involved in cases with losses higher than $20 million, and
only 14 were sentenced for frauds involving more than
$ioo million.2 9 Put another way, only 123 defendants were
sentenced using the top five of the sixteen total steps on the
current loss table, and only fourteen were sentenced using
the top three. This fact in itself should give rise to serious
doubt about the structure of a table that devotes nearly one-
third of its 16 levels to parsing the relative severity of the
crimes of just over one percent of the defendants to whom
it is applied.
Second, Commission staff helpfully identified the
number of specific offense characteristics other than loss
that were found by the court and applied in each FY 2012
defendant's case. Figure 8 in the staff presentation (repro-
duced below) suggests that relatively few SOCs are applied
in most cases, even at the high end of the loss spectrum.
For example, the chart shows that in seven of the eight loss
categories of $i million and higher, half or more of the
defendants were sentenced with either zero or only one
SOC in addition to loss. Some have suggested that this data
means that too many SOCs are not really a problem at high
loss levels.30 But considered more carefully, the Figure 8
data cannot support that sanguine conclusion.
To begin, even taken at face value, Figure 8 tells us that
one-third to one-half of all defendants with loss amounts
exceeding $2.5 million are sentenced with two or more
SOCs. More importantly, Figure 8 only counts types of
SOCs, not offense level increases imposed as a result of
each SOC. For example, an enhancement for more than
250 victims counts as one SOC, while violation of a securi-
ties law by an officer of a publicly traded company counts as
another. A mere two SOCs doesn't sound so bad.., until
you realize that together they add io offense levels (6 for
more than 250 victims and 4 for violation of securities law)
on top of the Base Offense Level of 7 and however many
additional levels were added for loss-which effectively
triples the defendant's guideline range. 3'
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Moreover, Figure 8 only counts "specific offense char-
acteristics" as such. It does not count the additional role-in-
the-offense enhancements that may be applied under
Chapter 3. Figure 9, reproduced below, shows that the
Aggravating Role adjustment (G 3 B.1) is applied to
10.5 percent of fraud cases under ) 2Bi.i, and the Abuse of
Trust or Use of Special Skill adjustment (6 3 BI. 3 ) to
T5.6 percent. These adjustments are not included in the
Figure 8 chart, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that
a fair number of defendants with losses over $i million also
received one or both of these adjustments in addition to loss
and some number of SOCs.
In addition, there is every reason to doubt the validity of
the data in Figures 8 and 9. I say this not because I doubt
that Commission staff carefully collects and accurately
reports the data they receive, but because the data reflect
only the SOCs and role enhancements found to exist by the
judge and applied in the sentencing calculus. What the staff
cannot capture is the effect of the simple fact that virtually
all these cases were plea bargained and that, particularly at
high loss levels, SOCs and role adjustments are routinely
bargained away.
How can we know that the numbers reported by the
courts often do not reflect how many SOCs would apply if
the facts of a high-loss case were honestly assessed? Com-
mon sense. For example, Figure 8 of the staff s presenta-
tion indicates that 22.4 percent of the FY 2012 cases with
loss over $2o million involved no SOCs-which seems
highly improbable without negotiated manipulation of the
numbers. Ask yourself how it would be possible to commit
a $2o million fraud that did not involve at least one of the
following: (a) at least io victims, (b) mass marketing,
(c) sophisticated means, (d) identity theft in some form,
(e) derivation of more than $i million gross receipts from
a financial institution, (f) charitable fraud, (g) bankruptcy
fraud, or (h) violation of securities or commodities law by
a corporate insider or broker. Such a thing may be possible,
but the suggestion that an offense of such exquisite rarity
occurred in more than one-fifth of the 67 reported cases
with more than $20 million in loss strains credulity to the
breaking point. Figure 8 also indicates that over 43 percent
of all cases with loss over $20 million involved only one
SOC, a figure which is scarcely more believable.
Why might the government be disposed to factor-
bargain away SOCs in high-loss cases? Recall that any fraud
defendant with a loss over, say, $20 million is already facing
an offense level of 29 (BOL 7 + 22 levels for loss) and
a sentencing range of 87-io8 months (7-9 years) without
a single SOC or role adjustment. Addition of 2 levels for
sophisticated means or any other enhancement generates
a total level 31 and a sentencing range of io8-135 months
(9-I years). Add 2 more levels for, say, a mere io victims
and the offense level becomes 33 and the sentencing range
135-T68 months (ii1-4 years). Prosecutors rarely press for
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sentences materially higher than that in a negotiated plea
for a white collar defendant, even one with a very big loss. 32
This phenomenon is evident in Figure 6 of the staffs pre-
sentation (reproduced below), which shows that the average
sentence for the 68 defendants in the >$20 million loss
category was exactly io8 months, while the average for the
42 defendants in the >$50 million loss category was even
lower, at 9 o months. Therefore, when the parties want
a plea agreement that generates a sentencing range a high-
loss defendant might be disposed to accept and a judge to
impose, they must either fact-bargain over loss amount, or
factor-bargain away those SOCs and role adjustments that
legally apply, but that are not necessary to get the sentence
to the agreed level, or enter into to a substantial assistance
agreement, or some combination of the three. The available
data strongly suggests that factor-bargaining is reasonably
common in such cases.
In addition, the ubiquity of bargained pleas in big fraud
cases suggests that loss amount itself is commonly negoti-
ated. If so, the distribution of sentenced defendants among
loss categories reported in the staffs Figures 6 and 8 prob-
ably under-reports the number of defendants whose crimes
actually caused losses in the highest categories-and thus
underestimates the distorting effect of the interaction of high
loss with multiple SOCs and role adjustments.
Finally, the staffs Figure 6 shows that, in high-loss
cases, judges are refusing to give effect to multiple SOCs
and role adjustments even when they are found to exist and
are factored into the official guideline calculation. Starting
with cases involving a more than $i million loss, the gap
between the bottom of the calculated guideline range and
the sentence actually imposed grows dramatically with
every step to the right to the next higher loss plateau. In
short, even though the parties may in many cases be mut-
ing the effect of multiple SOCs and role adjustments
through plea bargaining, the higher the loss plateau, the
less judges are inclined to impose the sentences called for
by even artificially depressed guideline levels.
Now the Commission might ask, "Why should we care
about excess SOCs and role adjustments in high-loss cases
if they are being routinely bargained away?" Two reasons:
First, the presence of so many surplus aggravating factors
gives prosecutors unfair bargaining leverage. It means that,
in a high percentage of high-loss cases, the government can
say, "If you go to trial, the guideline calculation will gen-
erate a sentencing range of 20 to 30 years or more-which
at least some judges will take seriously and impose. But if
you plead guilty, we can negotiate loss amount and factor-
bargain away those superfluous SOCs and role adjust-
ments, and bring the range down to a reasonable number of
years somewhere in the single or low double digits." The
guidelines undoubtedly play a role in all plea negotiations.
Properly conceived, that role is to set out for the parties the
parameters, upper and lower, of what the Sentencing
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Commission believes is a reasonable sentence. But if the
guidelines routinely call for sentences the Commission
does not really believe to be proper in the cases to which
they nominally apply, then the guidelines cease to serve as
honest advice to the parties and the courts about proper
punishment, and become nothing more than a bludgeon
for the government.
Second, leaving aside plea bargaining effects, the Sen-
tencing Commission should not endorse rules that, if
honestly applied, recommend sentences the Commission
does not believe appropriate and that judges will not
impose. To wave away concerns with excess SOCs for high-
loss defendants because they rarely drive actual sentences is
a plain dereliction of the Commission's duty. If the Com-
mission truly believes that the sentences called for by an
honest application of these guidelines to high-loss offen-
ders would produce just sentences-sentences it recom-
mends and would be willing to impose if it were the
judge-that is one thing. But if the Commission is
unwilling to change these rules only because they are so
obviously inappropriate in most of the cases to which they
nominally apply that the system now refuses to enforce
them, then leaving the rules alone is to perpetuate a perni-
cious official fiction-which is no less pernicious merely
because its worst impact is felt by only a few hundred
defendants each year.
Ill. The Commission's Amendments Do Little to Solve
the Problem of Distorted Sentences for High-Loss
Defendants
If the Commission is indeed determined to solve the
problem of unreasonably high guideline sentences in high-
loss cases-those identified by Judge Saris as involving loss
of more than $i million-the amendments adopted in this
cycle do very little to accomplish that end.
Inflation Adjustment. Adjusting the loss table for inflation
provides a 2-offense-level sentence reduction for defen-
dants at every level of the loss table who happen to fall in the
zone created by adjusting the top of the next lowest category
for inflation. An inflation adjustment is eminently reason-
able, but the change provides no special benefit to high-loss
cases. Indeed, because the loss categories are more closely
bunched at the bottom of the table (i.e., the difference
between a 2-level and 4-level loss enhancement is only
$5,ooo, whereas the difference between a 24-level and
26-level loss enhancement is $50 million), and because
there are far more defendants in the lower loss levels, this
change will benefit many more low-loss than high-loss
defendants.
Victim Adjustments. Beginning in November 2003,
\ 21I(b)(2) contained enhancements of 2, 4, and 6 levels
for cases with i, 5o, and 250 victims. The rationale for
these enhancements was that a defendant who steals
directly from many people has, in general, inflicted harm
on more persons than a defendant who steals directly from
only one. 33 Thus, it was thought reasonable to include in the
guidelines some acknowledgement of that fact. However,
the number of victims often correlates with loss amount
and should not be overemphasized as a separate factor. The
6-offense-level increase triggered by 250 victims-a situa-
tion not uncommon in high-loss cases-nearly doubled the
applicable guideline sentence.34 Plainly, mere victim
number had assumed far too much importance.
3 5
In January 2015, the Commission proposed addressing
the undue influence of victim number by reducing the size
of the S 2Bi.I(b)(2) victim enhancements from 2, 4, and
6 levels to 1, 2, and 3 levels.36 This was a sensible proposal,
and an approach the Commission should consider applying
to other S 2B1.I SOCs. However, in the final April 2015
version of the amendments, the Commission abandoned
the idea of halving the effect of victim number. Instead, it
rewrote S 2B1I(b)(2) to deemphasize victim number while
elevating the importance of the degree of financial harm
imposed on victims. That hybrid is discussed in the next
section.
Substantial Hardship. In January 2015, the Commission
proposed a new enhancement which would add I, 2, or
3 offense levels based on a finding of "substantial financial
hardship" to i, 5, or 25 victims.3 7 I understand the theory of
this amendment inasmuch as I proposed the basic idea
back in 1998.38 That proposal for a free-standing financial
hardship adjustment mutated during the 2003 debate over
the post-Sarbanes-Oxley round of amendments into an
alternative means of triggering the 4-level adjustment for
endangering the safety or soundness of financial institu-
tions or large companies found in S 2B1.I(b)(I6)(B) (2014).
In my March 2015 comments on the proposed amend-
ment, I wrote:
I no longer think that a separate adjustment for
imposing substantial financial hardship makes good
practical sense, particularly if it is a multi-level
adjustment scaled (necessarily somewhat arbitrarily)
to particular numbers of victims. At a moment when
we should be trying to reduce the number of diffi-
cult-to-exactly-define aggravators in 2B1., this
amendment would add one.
Moreover, the imposition of substantial financial
hardship surely correlates to some degree with large
loss amount. Consequently, whatever ameliorative
effect on high-loss cases the proposed amendment
to the victim table of S 2Bi.i(b)(2) [cutting the
enhancements for io, 50, and 250 victims from 2,
4, and 6 levels to i, 2, and 3 levels] may have, the new
substantial hardship enhancement will take away in
at least some cases. In short, the new amendment
will serve primarily to add yet another to the prolif-
erating list of SOCs that can boost the sentences of
fraud defendants generally, and high-loss defendants
in particular.
39
The Commission does not seem to have been entirely
persuaded. In its final April 2015 amendments, the
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Commission melded its proposed substantial hardship
amendment with its effort to reduce the effect of mere
victim number to produce a new 2 Bi.I(b)(2) that reads as
follows:
(Apply the greatest) If the offense-
(A) (i) involved io or more victims; or (ii) was committed
through mass-marketing; or (iii) resulted in substan-
tial financial hardship to one or more victims,
increase by 2 levels;
(B) involved 5e or more victims resulted in substantial
financial hardship to five or more victims, increase by
4 levels; or
(C) involved ze or more "Icfims resulted in substantial
financial hardship to 25 or more victims, increase by
6 levels.40
The result is a curious hybrid. On the one hand, it
retains both an enhancement based on mere victim num-
ber (io or more) and the original 2-, 4-, and 6-level tiered
structure. On the other hand it eliminates the 4-level and
6-level enhancements based on victim number alone,
requiring instead proof of "substantial financial hardship"
to multiple victims.
This change may have a very modest net ameliorative
effect in the universe of high-loss cases. Defendants will no
longer receive 4 or 6 levels merely for large victim num-
bers. Moreover, victims who have suffered "substantial
financial hardship" as defined in new Application Note 4 (F)
to 5 2Bi.I are a relatively small subset of victims generally.
And even in cases where "substantial financial hardship"
occurred, proving it for 5 or 25 victims is likely to prove
more troublesome than merely counting 5o or 250 victim
heads, and thus the government may routinely forego the
effort or bargain away the enhancement.
On the other hand, virtually all high-loss defendants will
continue to qualify for at least the 2-level bump for ro or
more victims. Some who would formerly have been hit with
increases for 5o or 250 victims will get increases of the
same size because they caused substantial hardship to
a relative few of those victims. And some who stole large
amounts from 5 or 25 victims rather than lesser amounts
from 5o or 250 victims will actually receive larger
enhancements than they did before.
In short, the number of cases to which 4 -level or 6-level
2Bi.i(b)(2) enhancements apply may diminish, but to
what extent is anybody's guess.
Sophisticated Means. In 2015, the Commission amended
the sophisticated means enhancement, 5 2Bi.I(b)(Io), to
specify that it applies only if the defendant being sentenced
engaged in or aided and abetted the sophisticated behavior
giving rise to the enhancement, as opposed to the offense as
a whole. The change seems unobjectionable. In practice, it
may give some relief to defendants with relatively minor
roles in complex schemes. But particularly in light of the
aiding and abetting provision, it seems unlikely to affect
very many cases.
Insufficient Aggregate Effect of Proposed Amendments.
The Commission's proposed amendments will reduce the
guideline sentences of some fraud defendants. However, as
illustrated by the representative cases in Tables A-i and A-2
below, most of those reductions will go to defendants who
caused moderate to moderately high loss. This seems odd
given Judge Saris's assertion that the courts and the Com-
mission were satisfied with the operation of 2B for
those defendants.
Odder still is the fact that these amendments will surely
have no effect at all on most high-loss defendants. Unless
a high-loss defendant happens to fall in the inflation-
adjusted zone of the loss table or be subject to a multiple
victim enhancement, his guideline calculation will be
untouched. Even for the few defendants who fortuitously
get the full benefit of both the main 2015 amendments, the
maximum possible reduction would be 6 levels: 2 for fall-
ing in the inflation-adjusted loss zone and 4 more if the
case involved more than 250 victims, but not at least
5 victims who suffer "substantial financial hardship," thus
transforming a 6-level victim boost to a mere 2. For
a defendant with a high multimillion dollar loss and mul-
tiple potential SOCs and role adjustments, even hitting the
6-level jackpot would scarcely dent his total offense level.
See for example, hypothetical Defendants H, I, and J in
Tables A-i and A-2.
The real takeaway from the 2015 tweak of5 2Bi.I is that
the Commission seems not to understand, or is at least
unwilling to address, the three most salient points about the
fraud guideline. First, S 2B1.i does not work in a significant
number of high-loss cases. Second, it does not work for
such cases (a) because the loss table is bloated, and (b)
because the Commission keeps teasing out-and awarding
additional offense levels for-more and more culpability
factors for which loss is already a proxy. The 2015 amend-
ments do not address the bloat in the loss table. And as to
the factor creep problem, while the 2015 amendments
decrease the influence of one factor, victim number, they
increase the influence of a different one, financial hardship,
by an amount that for at least some defendants exactly
offsets the victim number decline. Overall, the results will
be barely perceptible.
IV. Suggestions for Making High-Loss Guidelines Sen-
tences Realistic and Useful
If the Commission really wants to fix the problem of
unrealistic guideline sentences for high-loss defendants, it
must address three issues: (i) the failure to set a normative
upper limit on punishment for financial crime, (2) the
bloated loss table, and (3) the logarithmic sentence
increases generated by multiple SOCs and role adjust-
ments. Therefore, I would suggest the following measures.
A. Set a maximum limit on punishment for
economic crime
The seminal structural flaw in \ 2BI.I is the failure (a) to set
a ceiling on the punishment government can justifiably
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mete out for the most serious financial crimes, and then
(b) to scale the punishments for lesser forms down from
that maximum. In virtually every other crime category, the
guidelines provide some conception of the worst form of
that crime likely to face a sentencing judge and prescribe
a rough maximum sentence for that form. For first degree
murder, the offense level is 43 (life imprisonment).4'
Treason where "the conduct is tantamount to waging war
against the United States" has an offense level of 43.4' The
guideline for an attempted murder provides a maximum
offense level of 41 (27-33.75 years), even in an aggravated
case like an attempted contract killing where the victim
sustained permanent injury.43 Similarly, the robbery
guideline, S 2B3., is structured so that even a robbery with
virtually every possible aggravator generates an offense
level of no more than 41.44 Even a complex (and quite
tough) guideline like S 2D1.I governing drug crimes is
sufficiently well-calibrated that even its most serious forms,
with all applicable SOCs counted, rarely produce offense
levels that equal or exceed 43.
The result of having a ranking system that sets a ratio-
nally supportable upper limit on the most severe punish-
ment that should be imposed for the most serious variant of
a crime type is that judges can take seriously both the
highest sentence and the scale of lower sentences for that
crime type. Consider, for example, the robbery guideline,
which prescribes an offense level of 41 (27-33.75 years) for
an extremely aggravated form of robbery involving a feder-
ally insured bank, a shooting causing life-threatening
injury, and a huge pecuniary loss. Some judges might think
27 years too much for such an offense. But it is at least
within the realm a rational sentencing authority might
recommend, and thus judges will seriously consider
imposing it. That being so, if application of the robbery
guideline to a second defendant produces a lower offense
level of 3i (9-11.25 years), the judge will take that offense
level seriously, too, both as an indication of what sentence
the Commission actually believes should be imposed and
as a comparative measure of how much less serious the
second offense is than the first.
By contrast, S 2Bi.i sets no meaningful upper limit on
the punishment for economic crime. In high-loss cases, the
current version of S 2BI.I can quite easily generate offense
levels substantially above the 43 required for life impris-
onment, 45 which implies that the Commission thinks big
financial fraud is normatively far worse than murder, trea-
son, being a trigger-happy bank robber, or running a major
drug cartel. This sort of guideline excess breeds two
problems.
First, virtually no one believes that financial fraud is
worse than murder or treason or blood-soaked bank rob-
bery; in consequence, with rare exceptions, judges are
unwilling to sentence high-loss fraud defendants to the
terms nominally prescribed by the guidelines. Indeed, in
those cases that score worst by the metrics adopted in
S 2B1.i, the guidelines do not actually prescribe a sentence.
An offense level over 43 is not associated with
a recommended term of imprisonment; it is merely a really
big number-a sort of numerical epithet-that provides the
sentencing judge with no practical guidance.
Second, and even more importantly as a matter of
guideline design, because S 2B1.I so easily generates
offense levels near or above the top of the sentencing table,
judges have no useful yardstick for determining the relative
severity of cases with lower offense levels.
For example, suppose one high-loss defendant has
a calculated offense level of 44. Suppose further that the
sentencing judge, like most of her colleagues, does not
view that number as a serious indication the Commission
intends imposition of a sentence of 30 or more years, so
she imposes a sentence of 2o years. Then suppose that,
in the next case, the same judge encounters a fraud
defendant with a calculated offense level of 38. Should the
judge assume that the Commission does mean what it
says in fraud cases with offense levels below 43 and
impose the 235-month (roughly 2o-year) sentence called
for by the low end of the level 38 sentencing range? If so,
that would treat the level 38 defendant virtually identically
to the level 44 defendant. Or should she try to achieve
some proportionality between the sentences of the level
38 and level 44 defendants? If she decides to do the latter,
given that subtracting 6 offense levels roughly halves the
applicable guideline minimum sentence, should the judge
impose a sentence of io years on the level 38 defendant
(one-half the 2o-year sentence she imposed on the level
44 defendant)? And if she does that, what should she do
when she encounters a defendant with an offense level of
32, for whom the guideline minimum would be 121
months, or just over io years? In short, given that the
sentences nominally prescribed for some undefined sub-
set of high-loss cases are universally understood to be
fictional, judges cannot now determine the point on the
severity scale where the Commission really means what
it says.
Accordingly, the Commission should determine the
maximum punishment that should be imposed for finan-
cial crime absent the most extraordinary circumstances-
and then reverse-engineer S 2B1.i from that number
downward. The Commission should not try to write into
the guideline factors that might justify an extraordinary
sentence above this maximum. Identifying extraordinary
cases can properly be left to sentencing judges in the exer-
cise of their power to either depart from or vary above the
prescribed range.
B. Give the loss table a haircut
Even if the Commission is unprepared to reverse-engineer
S 2Bi.I in toto, it could take a number of simple steps that
would materially reduce the likelihood of transparently
silly, way-more-than-life-sentence guideline calculations in
high-loss cases. The first of these steps would be to elimi-
nate the top 4 levels of the loss table (those for loss
exceeding $5o million, $ioo million, $200 million, and
$400 million). In FY 2012, only 56 of the more than 7,000
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defendants sentenced under 2BI.I (or roughly 0.7 percent)
fell into these categories. Dividing those few dozen defen-
dants into four groups separated only by arbitrarily chosen
loss amounts does not advance the cause of rational
sentencing.
However, cutting some or all of the 4 top loss levels
would give some room for SOCs and role adjustments to
function meaningfully in high-loss cases. Cutting the top 4
would mean that loss amount alone would generate a max-
imum 22-level enhancement. When added to the base
offense level for fraud, this would produce an offense level
of 29, and a guideline range of 87-io8 months (7.25-9
years) for a first-time offender with no other SOCs or role
adjustments.
If loss alone could elevate a sentence only as far as level
29, it would start to make sense for prosecutors to advocate
and judges to seriously consider the SOCs in S 2BI.I and
role adjustments in Chapter 3 as means of rationally dis-
tinguishing between more and less serious high-loss
offenders. For example, if one is starting from a base of 29,
a 2-level sophisticated means adjustment added to a 4-level
increase for substantially jeopardizing a financial institu-
tion produces a level 35 and a range of 168-210 months
(4-17.5 years)-a sentence many judges would at least
seriously consider. By contrast, if one is starting at a base of
35 (base offense level of 7 plus 28 levels for loss greater than
$200 million), the same 6 levels of enhancements generate
an offense level of 41 and a range of 324-405 months
(27-33.75 years)-a sentencing level judges rarely take
seriously in white collar cases.
Remarkably, at the March 12, 2015, hearing on the 2015
amendments, Justice Department representative Benjamin
B. Wagner endorsed eliminating the top 4 levels of the loss
table:
[T]here was an interesting proposal in Mr. Bowman's
submission, which I think the Commission should
consider, about collapsing the top four levels in the
loss table and looking at whether or not you should
end it at everything over $20 million, that is-is 22
levels, and that that's your cap.
4 6
It is something of a mystery that, even with Justice
Department support, the Commission felt unable to amend
the table this year. Perhaps the next amendment cycle will
see progress.
C. Reduce the number, size, and cumulative impact
of specific offense characteristics in § 2B1.1
Even if the Commission were to eliminate the 4 top loss
levels, the number, magnitude, and potential cumulative
effect of the SOCs now in 5 2BI.I is so large that honest
application of those SOCs to the facts of high-loss cases
would continue to produce unrealistically high guideline
ranges.
Consider, for example, hypothetical Defendant I in
Tables A-i and A-2 below, who is CEO of a publicly traded
corporation operating a chain of hospitals and nursing
homes and, in collusion with four other members of his
management team, defrauds Medicaid and Medicare of
$io.i million and causes false statements to be made in
required SEC filings. Even though his loss enhancement is
"only" 20 levels, SOCs and role adjustments would raise
his final offense level to 42, corresponding to a sentence of
36o month (30 years) to life. 47 This defendant surely
deserves prison time. Maybe even a lengthy dose of it. But
few, if any, judges will consider a minimum sentence of
30 years to be a serious option.
If one is convinced of the need to reduce the number
and effect of S 2Bi.i SOCs, a variety of approaches could
help achieve that end. Here are a few suggestions:
i. Cap the cumulative effect of SOCs. The simplest solution
to the proliferating SOC problem would be to impose a cap
on the cumulative effect of all SOCs other than loss. If such
a cap were enacted, the court would be obliged to determine
the loss and all applicable SOCs, but the total offense level
could never be more than the sum of the Base Offense
Level, plus the offense level increase corresponding to loss
amount, plus the applicable number of SOC adjustments,
up to, but not exceeding, the cap. The cap could be set at any
number the Commission liked, but I would suggest that
careful consideration of two factors should determine the
result.
First, setting an SOC cap would accomplish the
objective suggested above of setting the maximum sen-
tence the Commission will sanction for economic crime,
absent the extraordinary circumstances that would justify
an upward departure or variance. Therefore, the cap
should be set after careful consideration of what that
maximum should be. In my own view, the maximum
ought not exceed something like 20-25 years. But under
no circumstances should any combination of guidelines
factors generate an offense level above the top of the
Sentencing Table.
Second, loss was chosen as a primary determinant of
sentence length in economic crime cases because it is,
standing alone, a good general proxy for offense serious-
ness. Factors in addition to loss, particularly if they are of
a type that correlates with loss, should not dramatically
overshadow the effect of loss itself. Therefore, I would
suggest that the cap be, at the very most, io levels because
an increase of ro levels triples the sentence from which one
began. 48 It hardly makes sense to allow other factors to have
more than triple the effect of the primary measure of offense
seriousness. Eight levels, which increases a sentence about
2.5 times, or 6 levels, which roughly doubles a sentence,
would be better.
The combination of eliminating the top 4 loss levels and
capping the effect of non-loss SOCs would have the addi-
tional benefit of leaving some room for role adjustments
under Chapter 3 to have a meaningful effect on the final
offense level calculation even in big cases. By way of illus-
tration, consider hypothetical Defendant J in Tables A-i and
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A-2 below (whose situation is akin to the principal Enron
defendants). Under the current guidelines, even if the 2015
amendments were adopted, his final offense level would be
55, including adjustments under Chapter 3 for aggravating
role and abuse of trust. In other words, the combination of
base offense level, loss amount, and \ 2B1.I SOCs pushes
his offense level so high that the Chapter 3 role adjustments
are functionally meaningless. However, if, as suggested
above, the loss enhancement were capped at 22 levels for
more than $20 million, and the SOC adjustments were
capped at ten (or fewer), Defendant J's offense level con-
sidering S 2BI factors only would be 39 (at most).
Accordingly, there would still be room on the Sentencing
Table for Chapter 3 role adjustments to count.
2. Reduce the number of levels assigned to many SOCs.
Virtually all of the offense level increases associated with
S 2B1.i SOCs are expressed in increments of two. For
example, the multiple victim adjustments of S 2B1.i(b)(2)
are for 2, 4, and 6 levels, employing sophisticated means
triggers a 2-level adjustment, and securities law violations
by a broker or dealer trigger a 4-level adjustment. Given that
every 2-offense-level increase raises a defendant's sentenc-
ing range by 25 percent, it seems doubtful that all of these
SOCs really merit sentence increases of the magnitude they
trigger.
In January 2015, the Commission proposed amending
the multivictim enhancement of S 2B1(b) (2) by reducing
the increments from 2, 4, and 6 levels to 1, 2, and 3 levels.
49
Although the Commission took a different approach in the
final version of this year's amendment to S 2BI.I(b)(2), it
should in the future consider whether the value of other
SOCs should be reduced in the way originally proposed for
2BI.m(b)(2).
Even if the Commission is not disposed to halve the
value of some S 2B SOCs for all defendants, it should
consider that the 25 percent sentence increase resulting
from a 2-level SOC translates into much more additional
prison time when applied to a defendant at the top of the
Sentencing Table than to one at the bottom. Therefore, it
might make sense to reduce the offense-level value of SOCs
for cases involving loss over a specified amount. For
example, the 4-level enhancement for violation of securities
law by a dealer or broker might remain for cases with loss
less than, say, $i million, but be reduced to 3 levels if the
loss was more than $i million, and 2 levels if the loss was
greater than $20 million. The dual objectives of such
graduated enhancements would be to make the sentencing
effect of a given SOC somewhat more constant for all
offenders and to prevent multiple SOCs from inflating the
guideline ranges of high-loss offenders into the zone of
unreality.
3. Eliminate the sophisticated means enhancement. The
theoretical function of the sophisticated means enhance-
ment is to give numerical expression to the idea that frauds
involving large amounts of planning activity and high levels
of specialized expertise are more blameworthy and socially
dangerous than frauds of a simpler sort. While the theory is
sound enough, 50 putting it into practice has proven con-
sistently frustrating. If loss is moderately large, courts vir-
tually always find sophisticated means in any but the very
simplest schemes, and often even in those.5' Even when the
loss is smaller, judgments about what criminal methods are
relatively more sophisticated than the norm are so subjec-
tive as to be essentially arbitrary.
Although I advocated the creation of a sophisticated
means enhancement back in 1998,52 I no longer think it
serves any useful purpose. It is particularly useless in high-
loss cases because stealing really big sums inevitably
involves methods the courts characterize as sophisticated
means. In such cases it serves only as a nearly inevitable
25 percent boost to already high guideline ranges. The
enhancement should be eliminated. If the Commission is
unwilling to eliminate it altogether, it should only be
available in moderate- to-low-loss cases (perhaps those with
losses less than $i million) as a way of winnowing especially
creative swindlers from the common run.
A final possibility for the sophisticated means
enhancement would be to eliminate it as a specific offense
characteristic that adds offense levels and transform it into
a factor judges would be encouraged to consider when
determining the position of a sentence within the advisory
sentencing range. In other words, the guideline would say
that, if sophisticated means were used, the judge should
consider it as a factor in setting a sentence above the min-
imum of the advisory range.
V. Conclusion
The Sentencing Commission's multiyear study of the fraud
guideline has so far produced a damp squib. Perhaps more
time for thought and the confirmation of two new com-
missioners will produce fireworks next year. At all events,
I hope the foregoing analysis and suggestions provide a bit
of ammunition for those who would like more percussive
change.
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Table A-1. Description of Representative Defendants
Def. A Teller in federally insured bank. Steals $2,000 from teller drawer.
Def. B Wife of social security recipient. Continues to cash checks after death of spouse. Loss = $11,000.
Def. C Defendant is a postal worker who steals credit cards from the mail and uses them to purchase goods worth $35,000, which he
then sells to support a drug habit.
Def. D Defendant commits online auction fraud from his home computer. Causes loss of $55,000 to more than 50 victims.
Def. E Doctor submits false billings to Medicare using complex system of double books. Loss = $125,000.
Def. F Telemarketer runs boiler room with 8 employees. Defrauds more than 250 elderly victims of $250,000.
Def. G Computer expert constructs scheme for stealing credit card and other personal information online. Using this information, he
obtains merchandise and phony car loans online totaling $450,000 from 25 individual and institutional victims.
Def. H President of small, publicly traded bank commits bank fraud causing loss of $1.1 million and collapse of the bank. In the course of
the offense, he causes false statements to be made in required SEC filings. Thirty employees lose their jobs.
Def. I CEO of publicly traded corporation operating chain of hospitals and nursing homes, in collusion with 4 other members of his
management team, defrauds Medicaid and Medicare of $10.1 million and causes false statements to be made in required
SEC filings.
Def. J CEO of large conglomerate, in collusion with CFO and other members of management, engage in accounting fraud and stock
manipulation causing bankruptcy of company and losses to shareholders and employee pension fund of $410 million.
Table A-2. Comparison of Guideline Ranges of Representative Defendants Under Existing Guidelines to Ranges Under
Proposed 2015 Amendment
5 3
1987 1989 1991 1998 Nov. 2001 Jan. 2003 2015
Def. A 0-6 mos. 54  0-6 mos.5 5  0-6 mos. 0-6 mos. 0-6 mos. 0-6 mos. 0-6 mos.
Def. B 2-8 mos. 5 6  4-10 mos.'7  4-10 mos. 4-10 mos. 12 mos. - 14 mos.5  4-10 mos.e0
Def. C 12-18 mosel 15-21 mos. 62  15-21 mos. 15-21 mos. 7-33 mos.63  30-37 mos. 4  24-30 mos.es
Def. D 10-16 mos. 66 12-18 mos.67  12-18 mos. 12-18 mos. 27-33 mos.- 30-37 mos.e
9  24-30 mos. 70
Def. E 21-27 mos. 7 ' 24-30 mos.72  24-30 mos. 24-30 mos. 33-41 mos.
73  37-46 mos. 74  30-37 mos. 75
Def. F 37-46 mos. 76 41-51 mos. 77  41-51 mos. 1--] m78-97 mos.
79  108-135 mos.eo 78-97 mos. e1
Def. G 24-30 mos. 82 30-37 mos.8 3  30-37 mos. 30-37 mos. 78-97 mos.84  37-108 mos.85 63-78 mos. 86
Def. H 27-33 mos. 8 7 37-46 mos. 88  57-71 mos. 89  57-71 mos. 121-151 mos
90 F10-262 mos.9 1 262-327 mos.9 2
Def. I 57-71 mos. 93 87-108 mos.9 4  87-108 mos. 87-108 mos. 151-188 mos.
9 5 262-327 mos.9 1 360-LIFE9 7
Def. J 57-71 mos. 98 121-151 mos.99 121-151 mos. 51-188mos. LIFE'' IFE
10 2  LIFE 0 3
plus 5 levels) plus 16 levels) (plus 12 levels)
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tencing Guidelines (Jan. 16, 2015), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-
friendly-amend ments/201 5014-RFP-Amendments.pd f.
37 Id.
38 Bowman, Coping With "Loss," supra note 35, at 502.
39 Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Comment on Proposed Amendments to




40 U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 7.
41 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1.
42 U.S.S.G. § 2M1.1.
43 U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1.
44 U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 prescribes an offense level of 41 for a robbery
involving a federally insured bank in which more than $5 mil-
lion was stolen and a victim was shot and suffered life-
threatening injury.
45 See Pavlo, supra note 32 (noting that one defendant in a $100
million fraud had a guideline offense level of 51).
46 Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, March 12, 2015, at 119-20 (testimony of Hon.
Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, Eastern District
of California).
47 Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense Level 7), increase of
20 levels for loss of more than $9.5 million but less than
$30 million (using the new inflation-adjusted loss table),
2-level sophisticated means, 4-level violation of securities law
by officer of publicly traded corporation, 3-level health care
fraud greater than $7 million, 4-level aggravating role, 2-level
abuse of trust.
48 For example, if the base offense level plus a loss over $20 mil-
lion generated an offense level of 29 (87-108 months), an
addition of 10 levels gives an offense level of 39 (262-327
months), or triple the sentencing range for level 29. The 25%
rule upon which the Sentencing Table is based gives a 10-level
increase the same tripling effect at every starting point
beginning at Offense Level 12, Criminal History Category I.
49 U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 36.
50 See Bowman, Coping With "Loss,'" supra note 35, at 497-500.
51 For a survey of the case law, see Roger W. Haines Jr., Frank 0.
Bowman, Ill, & Jennifer C. Woll, Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines Handbook, 2014-2015 ed., 400-403.
52 Bowman, Coping with "Loss," supra note 35.
53 Table A-2 assumes first-time offenders (Criminal History Cat-
egory I) convicted after trial. Sentences for defendants
pleading guilty would be slightly lower due to the acceptance
of responsibility reduction. Sentences for defendants with
criminal records would be slightly (in some cases consider-
ably) higher. Shaded boxes indicate a sentence increase due
to guideline change.
54 Offense Level 6. Assumes no "More than minimal planning"
(MMP).
55 Offense Level 6. Assumes no MMP.
56 Offense Level 8. Assumes no MMP.
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57 Offense Level 9. Assumes no MMP.
58 Offense Level 10. Assumes no MMP.
59 Offense Level 11. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 4-level increase for loss greater than $10,000.
60 Offense Level 9. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense Level
7), 2-level increase for loss greater than $6500 but less than
$15,000.
61 Offense Level 13. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP, 2-level
increase for abuse of trust.
62 Offense Level 14. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP, 2-level
increase for abuse of trust.
63 Offense Level 18. Assumes Base Offense Level of 6, 6-level
increase for loss greater than $30,000, 4-level increase for
undelivered U.S. Mail (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. note 3(B)
(2001)), 2-level increase for abuse of trust.
64 Offense Level 19. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 6-level increase for loss greater than $30,000, 4-
level increase for undelivered U.S. Mail (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app.
note 4(C)(i) (2003)), 2-level increase for abuse of trust.
65 Offense Level 17. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7, 4-level increase for loss greater than $15,000 but
less than $40,000, 4-level increase for undelivered U.S. Mail
(U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. note 4(C)(i) (2003)), 2-level increase
for abuse of trust.
66 Offense Level 12. Assumes MMP.
67 Offense Level 13. Assumes MMP.
68 Offense Level 18. Assumes fraud conviction, 4-level increase for
fewer than 50 victims, 2-level increase for sophisticated means.
r9 Offense Level 19. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 6-level increase for loss greater than $30,000, 4-
level increase for fewer than 50 victims, and 2-level increase
for sophisticated means.
70 Offense Level 17. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense Level
7), 6-level increase for loss greater than $40,000 but less than
$95,000, 2-level increase for fewer than 50 victims [Proposed
2B1.1(B)(2)(b)], and 2-level increase for sophisticated means.
71 Offense Level 16. Assumes MMP, 2-level abuse of trust.
72 Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP, 2-level abuse of trust.
73 Offense Level 20. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 2-level sophisticated means, 2-level abuse of trust.
74 Offense Level 21. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 10-level for loss greater than $120,000, 2-level
sophisticated means, 2-level abuse of trust.
75 Offense Level 19. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 8-level for loss greater than $95,000 but less than
$150,000, 2-level sophisticated means, 2-level abuse of trust.
76 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP, 4-level aggravating role, 2-
level vulnerable victim.
77 Offense Level 22. Assumes MMP, 4-level aggravating role, 2-
level vulnerable victim.
78 Offense Level 24. Assumes MMP, 4-level aggravating role, 2-
level vulnerable victim, 2-level mass marketing.
79 Offense Level 28. Assumes 4-level for more than 50 victims, 4-
level aggravating role, 2-level vulnerable victim.
80 Offense Level 31. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 12-level for loss of greater than $200,000, 6-level
for more than 250 victims, 4-level aggravating role, 2-level
vulnerable victim.
81 Offense Level 28. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense Level
7), 12-level for loss of exactly $250,000, 3-level for more than
250 victims, 4-level aggravating role, 2-level vulnerable victim.
82 Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP, 2-level use of special skill.
3 Offense Level 19. Assumes MMP, 2-level use of special skill.
84 Offense Level 26. Assumes 2-level sophisticated means, 2-
level access device/means of identification, 2-level for more
than 10 victims, 2-level use of special skill.
85 Offense Level 29. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of 14-level for loss greater than $400,000,
2-level sophisticated means, 2-level access device/means of
identification, 2-level for more than 10 victims, 2-level use of
special skill.
86 Offense Level 26. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 12-level for loss greater than $250,000 but less
than $550,000, 2-level sophisticated means, 2-level access
device/means of identification, 1 -level for more than 10 vic-
tims, 2-level use of special skill.
87 Offense Level 18. Assumes MMP, 2-level abuse of trust.
88 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP, 2-level abuse of trust.
89 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP, 2-level abuse of trust, 4-level
endanger financial institution.
90 Offense Level 32. Assumes 2-level for more than 10 victims,
2-level sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize financial
institution, 2-level abuse of trust.
91 Offense Level 37. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of 16-level for loss, 2-level for more than
10 victims, 2-level sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize
financial institution, 4-level officer of publicly traded corpo-
ration, 2-level abuse of trust.
92 Offense Level 39. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 14-level for loss of more than $550,000 but less
than $1.5 million, 6-level for substantial financial hardship to
more than 25 persons [assuming loss of a job triggers the
enhancement], 2level sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize
financial institution, 4-level officer of publicly traded corpo-
ration, 2-level abuse of trust.
33 Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP, 4-level aggravating role,
2-level abuse of trust.
94 Offense Level 29. Assumes MMP, 4-level aggravating role,
2-level abuse of trust.
95 Offense Level 34. Assumes 2-level sophisticated means,
4-level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
96 Offense Level 39. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 20-level for loss, 2-level sophisticated means,
4-level violation of securities law by officer of publicly traded
corporation, 4-level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
97 Offense Level 42. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 20-level for loss of more than $9.5 million but less
than $30 million, 2-level sophisticated means, 4-level violation
of securities law by officer of publicly traded corporation,
3-level health care fraud greater than $7 million, 4-level
aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
98 Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP, 4-level aggravating role,
2-level abuse of trust.
99 Offense Level 32. Assumes MMP, 4-level aggravating role,
2-level abuse of trust.
100 Offense Level 34. Assumes MMP, 2-level sophisticated means,
4-level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
101 Offense Level 48. Assumes 4-level for more than 50 victims,
2-level sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize soundness of
financial institution (pension fund), 4-level aggravating role,
2-level abuse of trust.
102 Offense Level 59. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), 30-level for loss, 6-level for more than 250 victims,
2-level sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize soundness of
financial institution (pension fund), 4-level violation of secu-
rities law by officer of publicly traded corporation, 4-level
aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
103 Offense Level 55. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense Level
7), 28-level for loss more than $300 million but less than $550
million, 6-level for substantial financial hardship to more than
25 persons, 2-level sophisticated means, 2-level jeopardize
soundness of financial institution (pension fund) [would be
4 levels but for 8-level cap on combined victim number/finan-
cial hardship/soundness of financial institution], 4-level viola-
tion of securities law by officer of publicly traded corporation,
4-level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
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